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Abstract
This paper revisits the fiscal "decentralization theorem", by relaxing the role of
the assumption that governments are benevolent, while retaining the assumption of
policy uniformity. If instead, decisions are made by direct majority voting, (i) cen-
tralization can welfare-dominate decentralization even if there are no externalities
and regions are heterogenous; (ii) decentralization can welfare-dominate central-
ization even if there are positive externalities and regions are homogenous. The
intuition is that the insensitivity of majority voting to preference intensity interacts
with the diﬀerent ineﬃciencies in the two fiscal regimes to give second-best results.
Similar results obtain when governments are benevolent, but subject to lobbying,
because now decisions are too sensitive to the preferences of the organised group.
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1. Introduction
The fiscal decentralization theorem, formalized in Oates(1972), provides an answer to
one of the fundamental problems in public finance: to which level of government should
the authority to tax and provide public goods be allocated? The theorem shows that,
under certain assumptions, this choice depends on the size of regional or local public good
spillovers and diﬀerences in preferences for (or costs of provision of) public goods between
regions. If spillovers are small, and diﬀerences across regions large, then decentralization
is preferred, and if the reverse holds, centralization is preferred. This simple theory has
an enduring appeal.
However, in the recent past, the assumptions of the decentralization theorem have
come under increasing scrutiny. As is well-known, two key assumptions are made: firstly,
that each level of government is benevolent ; that is, whether central or sub-central gov-
ernment maximizes the welfare of citizens in its jurisdiction. The second assumption is
that with centralization, per capita levels of public good provision are uniform across
jurisdictions1.
Besley and Coate(2003) and Lockwood(2002) relax both of these assumptions simul-
taneously by supposing that with centralization, local public good provision need not be
uniform, and moreover, levels of public good provision are determined by bargaining be-
tween regional or district delegates to a legislature. The paper of Besley and Coate(2003)
explicitly focusses on whether the decentralization theorem extends to this setting. They
find that it does not, due to strategic delegation eﬀects2. Specifically, they show that even
with identical districts and some public good spillovers, centralization may generate less
aggregate surplus than decentralization, because with centralization, voters in a district
may have an incentive to vote for a delegate with a higher preference for the public good
than their own in order to tilt the balance of public good provision towards their region
and away from the other one.
This note asks whether it is really necessary to relax both fundamental assumptions
in order to invalidate the decentralization theorem. In one direction, the answer to this
1Oates did not provide a very explicit justification of his assumption in his 1972 book: all he says is that
"If public goods are supplied by a central government, one should expect a tendency towards uniformity
in public programs across all communities." (p11). But, recently, several diﬀerent explanations as to why
regions might agree ex ante to uniformity at a constitutional stage have been proposed. For example,
Harstad(2007) argues that it can prevent wasteful delay in bargaining in the national legislature, and
Hindriks and Lockwood(2005) argue that it may constrain rent-seeking politicians.
2Note that they only show that the theorem fails in one "direction" i.e. in their model, it is still true
that with heterogenous regions and no spillovers, it is still true that decentralization is always preferred.
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question is rather trivial. If uniformity is relaxed, while retaining benevolence, then
centralization obviously at least weakly dominates decentralization, and strictly dominates
unless there are no spillovers. This is also true, quite generally, even if only regional
government can observe citizen preferences for the public goods3. So, the interesting
question4 is what happens when the benevolence assumption is relaxed (or changed)
while retaining policy uniformity.
There are of course, a large number of ways of replacing the benevolence assumption.
But, the most interesting of these, because it is so simple and widely used5, is to assume
that decisions by each level of government are made by majority voting6. In other words,
to replace the assumption of a benevolent dictator with that of a direct democracy. In
this paper, we show that generally, with this simple change, the decentralization theorem
fails in both "directions". That is, examples can be found where (i) decentralization
welfare-dominates centralization even with externalities and identical preferences across
regions, and (ii) centralization welfare-dominates decentralization with no externalities
and diﬀerent preferences across regions.
The intuition is that these are second-best results. Either fiscal regime has one source
of ineﬃciency, and at the same time, majority voting has a well-known ineﬃciency, that
it does not measure intensity of preference. This ineﬃciency can interact with the in-
eﬃciencies in the two fiscal regimes in such a way as to overturn the Decentralization
Theorem. For example, it is easy to construct examples (see Example 1 below) where the
median voter has a higher preference for the public good than the average voter. This
tendency towards overprovision oﬀsets the underprovision with decentralization arising
form failure to internalize positive externalities, and can make decentralization superior,
3If citizen preferences are linear in the private good, then from standard mechanism design results
(e.g. Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green((1995), p885), it is possible for central government to choose
taxes so as induce citizens to truthfully reveal their preferences for the public good, while balancing the
budget and without distorting public good supply.
4An additional reason why this is the most inteesting line of enquiry is that while there is some debate
over whether the uniformity assumption is approximated in practice (see e.g. Knight(2004)), there is a
certainly a consensus in economics that "benevolent dictators" do not describe real processes of political
decision-making.
5A very partial list of papers in fiscal federalism that assume majority voting (along with policy
uniformity) would include Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro(2005), Alesina and Spolare(1997), Bolton and
Roland(1997), (1998), Cremer and Palfrey(1996),(2000), Gilbert and Picard(1996), Oberholzer-Gee and
Strumpf(2002).
6Note that because we retain the uniformity assumption, a determinate outcome with unrestricted
majority voting is assured.
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even with externalities and identical preferences. It is somewhat more diﬃcult - but pos-
sible - to construct examples (see Example 2 below) where majority voting magnifies
the heterogeneity across regions, thus leading to levels of public good provision under
decentralization that are too heterogenous. Then, uniform provision under centralization
can dominate, even with no externalities and diﬀerent preferences across regions.
These results can be contrasted with those of Besley and Coate(2003). In particular,
this note shows that it is not necessary to introduce representative democracy and non-
uniformity of public good provision in order to invalidate the decentralization theorem:
direct democracy is enough, even with uniformity. Moreover, the mechanism at work in
our setting is completely diﬀerent than in Besley and Coate. As democracy is direct, there
is no strategic delegation by voters. Finally, we get invalidation of the decentralization
theorem in both "directions", whereas as already remarked, in their model,with heteroge-
nous regions and no spillovers, it is still true that decentralization is always preferred.
This paper also considers another popular way of relaxing the benevolence assump-
tion; to assume, following Grossman and Helpman(1994), and Dixit, Grossman and Help-
man(1997), that each level of government is benevolent, but also values payments from
special interest groups. Again, we retain the assumption of policy uniformity. To avoid
trivial results, we are careful to keep the structure of special interest groups the same in
the two fiscal regimes. In this case, we also get a failure of the Decentralization Theorem
in both directions. The key point is that with special interests, decision-making is too
sensitive to the preferences of the organized group. This ineﬃciency can interact with the
ineﬃciencies in the two fiscal regimes to produce second-best results of a similar kind to
with majority voting.
Related literature, other than that already mentioned, is as follows. First, there are
a number of well-known papers that, as part of their analysis, compute the outcome
with some form of fiscal centralization, assuming policy uniformity to reduce the policy
space down to one dimension, and then assuming majority voting (Alesina, Angeloni, and
Etro(2005), Alesina and Spolare(1997), Bolton and Roland(1996), (1997), Cremer and
Palfrey(1996),(2000), Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf(2002))). But, the main focus of these
papers is typically on more positive issues (e.g. secessions, size of international unions,
etc), and so none of these papers specifically deals with the normative issue addressed in
this paper.
Second, there is a recent literature on special interest groups and fiscal decentral-
ization (Bardhan and Mookherjee(2000), Bordignon, Colombo, and Galmarini (2003),
Redoano(2003), Ruta(2006)). However, again, this literature really focusses on positive
issues, such as the number of lobbies and size of lobby payments under diﬀerent fiscal
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regimes. So, the simple point noted in this paper does not seem to have been made
before.
The layout of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model,
Section 3 contains examples and results, and Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
The model is a somewhat more general version of Besley and Coate(2003), henceforth
BC. The economy comprises two geographical regions i = 1, 2. Each is populated by a set
of citizens of size unity. There are three goods in the economy, a single private good, and
two public goods. Each citizen is endowed with some amount of the private good. One
unit of the private good produces one unit of the public good.
Each citizen in district i is characterized by a public good parameter θ. Preferences
over the private and public goods for this citizen are given by
θ[(1− σ)v(gi) + σv(gj)] + xi, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 0.5 (2.1)
So, σ measures the degree of spillovers7. In each district, θ has support Θ (where Θ can
be discrete or an interval) , and has a mean θi and median mi. Unlike BC, we do not
assume θi = mi; this assumption is definitely restrictive, as we show below.
Under a decentralized system, gi is chosen by the government of region i, and public
expenditures are funded by a uniform head tax on regional residents. That is, each
citizen pays gi. Under a centralized system, g1, g2 are both determined by a national
government. In this case, there is a uniform head tax on all citizens, so each citizen pays
(g1 + g2)/2 i.e. cost-sharing. So with centralization there is uniformity of both the taxes
and expenditures8 .
Following BC, and most other contributions in this area, we will rank fiscal regimes
using the criterion of the sum of utilities, which, due to the quasi-linearity of preferences,
is equivalent to aggregate surplus from provision of the public good. That is defined as
S(g1, g2) = [θ1(1− σ) + θ2σ]v(g1) + [θ2(1− σ) + θ1σ]v(g2)− (g1 + g2) (2.2)
7BC assume v(g) = ln g.
8This last assumption captures in a crude way the widely observed fact that centrally determined tax
rates e.g. income tax rates, are the same across regions. Under the assumption of quasi-linear preferences,
the assumption is not needed for the Decentralization Theorem to hold, but it is helpful when considering
majority voting, as otherwise the policy space is multidimensional and there may be voting cycles.
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The eﬃcient level of public good provision that maximizes aggregate surplus therefore
satisfies the Samuelson condition
[θi(1− σ) + θjσ]v0(g∗i ) = 1 (2.3)
3. Analysis
3.1. The Decentralization Theorem
We begin by briefly stating our benchmark decentralization theorem. Under decentraliza-
tion, gDi must maximize the surplus in region i only, i.e. θi[(1−σ)v(gi)+σv(gj)]−gi, taking
gj as given. The outcome under decentralization is therefore described by by the first-order
condition to this problem:
θi(1− σ)v0(g∗i ) = 1 (3.1)
Comparing (2.3) and (3.1), it is obvious that decentralization is generally ineﬃcient be-
cause spillovers are not internalized.
Under centralization, gCi must maximize the aggregate surplus(2.2), subject of course
to the constraint that gCi = gC2 = gC . The outcome under decentralization is therefore
given by the first-order condition to this problem:
θ1 + θ2
2
v0(gC) = 1 (3.2)
Comparing (2.3) and (3.2), it is generally the case that centralization is ineﬃcient because
uniformity is imposed. So, we can state:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the benevolence and uniformity assumptions are satisfied.
(i) If the average preference for the public good is the same in both regions (θ1 = θ2)
and spillovers are present (σ > 0) a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus
than a decentralized system.
(ii) If the average preferences are diﬀerent in both regions (θ1 6= θ2), and no spillovers
are present (σ = 0) a decentralized system produces a higher level of surplus than a
centralized system.
As is well-known, as long as the basic benevolence and uniformity assumptions are
made, this result is much more general than the model i.e. it does not depend on the
specific assumptions made above , e.g. the form of preferences, only two regions, and even
the uniform taxation assumption.
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3.2. Majority Voting and the Decentralization Theorem
We now show that if we replace the assumption of a benevolent policy-maker with decision-
making via majority voting over the set of possible public good levels, while retaining the
policy uniformity assumption, both parts of the decentralization theorem can fail.
Example 1: Decentralization welfare-dominates centralization with externalities and
identical preferences across regions. Assume θi ∈ {θl, θh} θl < θh and let λ > 0.5 be
the share of type-h in region, i = 1, 2. Then, the median voter is a type-h both in each
region and the entire economy.
So, equilibrium public good supply under decentralization in each region must be the
most preferred supply of the type-h : that is, gD1 = gD2 = gD must solve (3.1), except
that θi is replaced by θh :
(1− σ)θhv0(gD) = 1 (3.3)
As the median voter is high-preference in the whole economy, equilibrium public good
supply with centralization must be the most preferred supply of the type-h citizen, taking
into account the uniformity constraint g1 = g2, which forces the median voter to internalize
the spillover. That is, gC must solve (3.2), where θ1, θ2 are replaced by θh;
θhv0(gC) = 1 (3.4)
Finally, from (2.3), eﬃcient supply is
θv0(g∗) = 1, θ = λθh + (1− λ)θl (3.5)
Now assume that (1− σ)θh = θ : then gD = g∗ < gC : in this case, decentralization must
generate higher aggregate surplus than centralization. ¤
The intuition is that majority voting biases the outcome in the direction of too high
a level of the public good: this oﬀsets the bias in the direction of too low a level of the
public good with decentralization, making it more eﬃcient.
To get an example where the opposite can occur, i.e. where centralization welfare-
dominates decentralization with no externalities and diﬀerent preferences across regions
is considerably more work. The following example is constructed so that the median voter
in each region is an "extremist". Thus, under decentralization, public good provision is
too heterogenous across regions. Of course, under centralization, public good provision
is too uniform across regions. But under some conditions, excessive heterogeneity can be
worse than excessive uniformity.
Example 2: Centralization welfare-dominates decentralization with no externalities and
diﬀerent preferences across regions. Assume θ ∈ {γ − δ, γ, γ + δ}. Call these preferences
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low, medium, high (L,M,H) respectively. In region 1, the shares of population with
L,M,H are 1+ε
2
, 1−ε
2
, 0 respectively. In region 2, the shares of population with L,M,H
are 0, 1−ε
2
, 1+ε
2
, where ε < 1. Moreover, the utility functions9 are
u(g, θ) = g(1 + θ)− g
2
2
, θ = γ − δ, γ + δ (3.6)
u(g, θ) = g(1 + θ)− g
4
4
, θ = γ
Note that M agents care more about deviations from their ideal point, γ, than do L or
H agents.
The equilibrium supplies with decentralization are easy to find. In region 1, the L-type
is the median voter, so his most preferred level of public good provision is chosen i.e. the
maximizer of u(g1, γ − δ)− g1, implying from (3.6), gD1 = γ − δ. In region 2, the H-type
is the median voter, so his most preferred level of public good provision is chosen, which
in the same way, can be calculated at gD2 = γ + δ.
With centralization, as ε < 1, overall, the M type is the median voter, so his most
preferred level of public good provision g1 = g2 = g is chosen. This maximizes u(g, γ)− g,
i.e. gC = γ.
We now need to show that gC , gC yields higher aggregate surplus than gD1 , gD2 . Surpluses
in regions 1 and 2 are S1(g1), S2(g2) where
S1(g) =
1 + ε
2
[(γ − δ)− g
2
2
] +
1− ε
2
[gγ − g
4
4
]
S2(g) =
1 + ε
2
[(γ + δ)− g
2
2
] +
1− ε
2
[gγ − g
4
4
]
So, we need to show that S1(γ)+S2(γ) > S1(γ−δ)+S2(γ+δ). Because of symmetry of the
model, S1(γ) = S2(γ), S1(γ−δ) = S2(γ+δ), so it is suﬃcient to show S1(γ) > S1(γ−δ).
Note that there are two opposing forces determining the relative size of S1(γ)−S1(γ−
δ). First, L-agents are in a majority, and they get what they want with decentralization.
Opposing this is the fact that M-agents dislike deviations from their ideal point, γ, more
than do L-agents. This latter intensity of preference is not taken into account by majority
voting, but for a wide range of parameter values, dominates the first eﬀect, implying that
S1(γ) > S1(γ − δ).
This is shown in Table 1 below, where we allow the two key parameters, the size of
the majority of the extreme -preference agents, ε, and the diﬀerence in ideal points, δ, to
vary.
9These utility functions do not quite fit the form (2.1), but the Decentralization Theorem certainly
holds for preferences of the form (3.6).
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Table 1: Welfare under Diﬀerent Fiscal Regimes
δ 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5
ε 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
S1(γ) 0.338 0.118 0.558 0.300 0.263 0.225
S1(γ − δ) 0.287 0.048 0.554 0.269 0.251 0.233
This table indicates that quite uniformly, centralization is welfare preferred: decen-
tralization only dominates when ε = 0.4 i.e. nearly 70% of the citizens in each region are
extremists. ¤
So, we have seen that the Decentralization Theorem may fail in both "directions"
when utility-maximisation is replaced by majority voting. But, careful inspection of
both examples reveals that in each case, preferences within a region are asymmetrically
distributed, so that θi 6= mi. One might guess that with a symmetric distribution of
preferences within each region, Proposition 1 might continue to hold even with majority
voting, and this is indeed the case. To prove this, just note first that with either fiscal
regime, the outcome under majority voting is the same as that with utility maximization.
So, we can state:
Proposition 2. Suppose that the benevolence assumption is replaced by decision making
by majority voting. Then the Decentralization Theorem continues to hold if θi = mi, i =
1, 2.
At this point, more comparison with BC’s results might be helpful. First, our model in
this section is one of direct, rather than representative, democracy: the latter is assumed in
BC. Moreover, BC assume θi = mi, i = 1, 2. So, the overall conclusion is that if preference
distributions are asymmetric, the Decentralization Theorem can fail even with direct
democracy, due to "second-best" eﬀects, but if preference distributions are symmetric, the
Decentralization Theorem can only fail with representative democracy, due to "strategic
delegation" eﬀects.
3.3. Special Interests and the Decentralization Theorem
We now modify the assumption of a benevolent policy-maker in a diﬀerent way. We
continue to assume that the policy-maker maximises the sum of utilities of the citizens
in his jurisdiction, but we now assume that some of the citizens in each jurisdiction are
organized into a special interest group (SIG). We model the influence of the SIG using
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the well-known common agency model of lobbying (Grossman and Helpman(1994), Dixit,
Grossman and Helpman(1997)).
In this case, the appropriate welfare criterion is more problematic: should the welfare
of the policy-maker be included in any way when evaluating regimes? Previously, the use
of total surplus as a criterion implies that only the welfare of citizens matters, and so for
consistency, we also assume that here. This means that the welfare of the SIG must be
calculated net of any contributions made in equilibrium.
The key point is that with special interests, the preferences of the organized group
are overrepresented. This ineﬃciency can interact with the ineﬃciencies in the two fis-
cal regimes in such a way as to overturn the Decentralization Theorem, again, a kind-of
second-best result. Again, we show that the Decentralization Theorem fails in both direc-
tions by presenting two examples.
Example 3: Decentralization welfare-dominates centralization with externalities and
identical preferences across regions. There are two preference groups in the population,
i.e. θi ∈ {θl, θh} , θl < θh and λi is the share of type-h in region i, with λ1 = λ2 = λ.
In each region, group h is organized as a SIG and group l is not i.e. there are two SIGs,
one in each region. Eﬃcient supply of the public good is the same in both regions, and is
given by
(λθh + (1− λ)θl) θv0(g∗) = 1 (3.7)
Equilibrium supply under decentralization is as follows . Let ui,j = θj[(1− σ)v(gi) +
σv(gj)] − gi, j = h, l. The policy-maker in i is benevolent i.e. maximises aggregate
surplus in region i, λui,h + (1 − λ)ui,l but also takes contributions ci from the special
interest group10 in i, which he weights at γ. The equilibrium11 contribution of this group
can be calculated (see Dixit, Grossman and Helpman(1997), and it is well-known that
given the equilibrium contribution, the policy-maker then maximizes aggregate surplus in
region i, plus γλui,h i.e.
λ(1 + γ)ui,h + (1− λ)ui,l (3.8)
taking gj as given. Given that both regions are the same, it can easily be calculated that
the gD that maximises (3.8) solves
(1− σ)(λ(1 + γ)θh + (1− λ)θl)
λ(1 + γ) + 1− λ v
0(gD) = 1 (3.9)
10So, we assume that a SIG in one region cannot lobby the policy-maker in another region. For a model
where such "cross-regional lobbying" can occur, see Bordignon, Colombo, and Galmarini (2003).
11Here and what follows, by "equilibrium" we mean the (unique) equilibrium in truthful or compen-
sating contributions (Dixit, Grossman and Helpman(1997)).
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Finally, the equilibrium contribution fully compensates the policy-maker for the deviation
from g∗ in (2.3). In the case of one SIG, it is well-known that this contribution (denoted
cD) is the money equivalent of the loss in welfare for the policy-maker from setting gD
instead of g∗. Note for future reference that if γ → ∞, so that the policy-maker puts a
very high weight on money payments, then cD → 0.
Equilibrium with centralization is as follows. The structure of the SIGs is the same
as with decentralization i.e. the h-types are organized separately in each region. But
now, each makes an independent contribution c1, c2 to the national policy-maker. This
policy-maker is benevolent i.e. maximizes
P
i=1,2 λui,h+ (1− λ)ui,l but also weights total
contributions c1 + c2 at γ. The equilibrium contribution of each group can be calculated,
and it is well-known that given the equilibrium contribution, the policy-maker then max-
imizes X
i=1,2
λ(1 + γ)ui,h + (1− λ)ui,l
subject to g1 = g2 = g. The solution gC to this problem solves
(λ(1 + γ)θh + (1− λ)θl)
λ(1 + γ) + 1− λ v
0(gC) = 1 (3.10)
Note from (3.7)-(3.10), that gC > g∗ > gD. that is, with centralization, there is oversupply,
due to the influence of the SIG.
Now, assume that (1−σ)θh = θ : then, for γ →∞, gD ' g∗ < gC , and as just argued,
cD → 0. So, as SIG contributions under centralization are non-negative, decentralization
welfare-dominates for γ high enough. ¤
Note that the intuition behind the example is very similar to Example 1: namely,
lobbying biases the outcome in the direction of too high a level of the public good: this
oﬀsets the bias in the direction of too low a level of the public good with decentralization,
making decentralization more eﬃcient than centralization.
Example 4: Centralization welfare-dominates decentralization with no externalities and
diﬀerent preferences across regions. This is like Example 3, except: σ = 0, λ1 > λ2 = 0.5,
and the h−types are only organized in a SIG in region 2. Note that because there is
only one SIG in each fiscal regime, for γ high enough, the contributions by the SIG will
be vanishingly small, and we can ignore them and just focus on aggregate surplus (2.2)
when comparing welfares under the two regimes.
Eﬃcient supply is again given by (3.7). Following the argument of Example 3, and
recalling that λ2 = 0.5, σ = 0, equilibrium supply under decentralization is
(λ1θh + (1− λ1)θl) v0(gD1 ) = 1,
(1 + γ)θh + θl
2 + γ
v0(gD2 ) = 1 (3.11)
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Supply is eﬃcient in region 1 i.e. gD1 = g∗1, as no SIG is organized there. Also, assume
that1+γ
2+γ = λ1, i.e. the lobby power of h−types in region 2 just oﬀsets their reduced
numbers relative to region 1. Then from (3.7,3.11), gD1 = gD2 = gD = g∗1.
Equilibrium with centralization is as follows. The policy-maker is benevolent but also
takes contributions c2 from the special interest group in region 2 only, which he weights
at γ. So, following the argument of Example 3, and recalling that λ2 = 0.5, σ = 0, gC
must maximize
λ1u1,h + (1− λ1)u1,l + 0.5(1 + γ)u2,h + 0.5u2,l.
The first-order condition is
(λ1 + 0.5(1 + γ))θh + (1− λ1 + 0.5)θl)
2 + 0.5γ
v0(gC) = 1 (3.12)
So, by comparing (3.11), (3.12), we see that g∗2 < gC < gD = g∗1. That is, expenditure is
uniform under both fiscal regimes, but with centralization, the outcome is strictly between
the optimal levels in the two regions.
We can now show that welfare is higher with centralization. Note from (2.3) that
aggregate surplus from an arbitrary uniform level of provision g is proportional to:
S(g, g) = ((λ1 + 0.5)θh + (1− λ1 + 0.5)θl)v(g)− 2g (3.13)
This is concave in g, and by inspection of (3.12),(3.13), has a maximum at gˆ, gˆ < gC <
gD. So, it follows immediately that S(gC , gC) < S(gD, gD) for all γ, which is the required
result. ¤
One question which then arises is whether there is a simple condition (similar to that in
Proposition 2) such that the decentralization theorem holds, even with lobbying. There
is such a condition, which is that both preference groups in each region are organized
into separate SIGs. Then, taking into account contributions, the policy-maker in i under
decentralization maximizes
λ(1 + γ)ui,h + (1− λ)(1 + γ)ui,l
which is just a linear transformation of total surplus in region i, and thus he will behave
just like a benevolent policy-maker. A similar argument applies under centralization. So,
we can state:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the benevolence assumption is replaced by decision making
by a benevolent policy-maker subject to lobbying by SIGs. Then the Decentralization
Theorem continues to hold if both preference groups are organized into SIGs in each
region.
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4. Conclusions
This paper has revisited the fiscal "decentralization theorem", by relaxing the role of the
assumption that governments are benevolent, while retaining the assumption of policy
uniformity. We find that if instead, decisions are made by direct majority voting, (i)
centralization can welfare-dominate decentralization even if there are no externalities and
regions are heterogenous; (ii) decentralization can welfare-dominate centralization even
if there are positive externalities and regions are homogenous. The intuition is that the
insensitivity of majority voting to preference intensity interacts with the diﬀerent ineﬃ-
ciencies in the two fiscal regimes. Thus, strategic delegation eﬀects are not necessary to
invalidate the theorem. But, these counter-examples do depend on asymmetric preference
distributions within regions: when the mean and median willingness to pay is the same
within every region, the decentralization theorem generalizes to majority voting. Similar
results obtain when governments are benevolent, but subject to lobbying.
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